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THE INTRACTABLE OBSCENITY PROBLEM 2.0:
THE EMERGING CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF "LOCAL COMMUNITY
STANDARDS" ONLINE
Matthew Dawson+

"And he roused a certain craving passion in her ... ; she had to go on after
he had finished, in the wild tumult and heaving of her loins, while he
heroically kept himself up, and present in her . . . till she brought about her

own crisis, with weird little cries."' The above, and other vivid, erotic
passages, resulted in uncensored copies of D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's
Lover being banned in the United States for decades.2 The U.S. Post Office
routinely seized any uncensored copies of the novel found in the mail.3 In
1959, however, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York lifted the ban, and within a year, the book had nearly topped the
New York Times best-seller list. 4
In 1999, New York City threatened to withhold funding from the Brooklyn
Museum of Art after the museum refused to remove from public view a Chris
Ofili canvas depicting the Virgin Mary. 5 Ofili sparked the controversy by
depicting the venerated mother of Jesus with a bare breast and by using
elephant dung and photographs of female genitalia to supplement more
traditional painting supplies. 6 Ofili's work has since been featured in galleries

+ J.D. Candidate, May 2012, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
Davidson College, B.A. Economics, 2002. The author would like to thank Professor David Irwin
and Christina Kube for their suggestions and the staff of the Catholic University Law Review.
The author would also like to thank Shannon for tolerating the questionable Internet search
history that researching online obscenity frequently produced.
1.
2.

D.H. LAWRENCE, LADY CHATTERLEY'S LOVER 53 (1928).
See Fred Kaplan, Op-Ed., The Day Obscenity Became Art, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2009, at

A21 (noting that "graphic sex scenes" fueled the extended prohibition of the novel).
3. See id. (noting that eventually, the U.S. Post Office was sued for continually
confiscating the novel).
4.
5.

Id.
Gary Younge, After the Elephant Dung: Chris Ofili, GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2010),

http://www.guardian.co.uk/artanddesign/2010/jan/16/chris-ofili-gary-younge-interview
(describing former New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's attempts to force the museum to remove
the painting, which he described as "horrible and disgusting"). Giuliani also initiated a federal
lawsuit to compel the museum "to censor its choice of artists." Id The court eventually ruled
against Giuliani on First Amendment grounds. Id.
6.

Id.
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on several continents, and he was even offered a position with Britain's
renowned Royal Academy. 7
A blurred boundary has long existed between art and obscenity, between
work intended to "needle, question, [and] open up . . . content to new

interpretation" 8 and work with no "serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value."9 This distinction is extremely significant in the legal realm
because obscenity falls wholly outside the protection of the First
Amendment. 10 As a result, distribution of obscenity is punishable as a criminal
offense and often carries harsh penalties and prison sentences."
Despite the severe potential sanctions, however, no precise legal definition
of obscenity exists.12 Instead, courts have relied on a broad, vague test rooted
in "contemporary community standards" to determine whether material is
obscene.' Consequently, obscenity is a "legal conclusion" reached by the trier
4
of fact using a test set forth by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California.1
As
a result, publishers of potentially obscene material can rarely predict with any
accuracy whether they will face criminal prosecution. s
7. Id.
8. Anne Roiphe, Even in ElephantDung There Is Beauty, N.Y. OBSERVER (Oct. 10, 1999),
http://www.observer.com/node/42062.
9. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
10. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (acknowledging the

long-standing precedents that have stripped obscene material of First Amendment protection
because of its proscribable content); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978); Miller,
413 U.S. at 36.
11. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (2006) (stating that one who distributes obscene materials
may be fined and sentenced to a maximum of five years in prison for a first offense, and
additional offenses carry a ten-year maximum penalty). The five-year prison term is comparable
to sentences issued to "drug traffickers, firearms offenders and racketeers." See Adam Pollack,
The Typical Time Served by Federal Criminals, YAHOO! CONTRIBUTOR NETWORK (Jan. 22,

2010), http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/2614977/thetypicaltimeservedbyfederal.
html. State laws also provide for severe penalties. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-81(c)
(2007) (describing the maximum penalty for distributing obscene materials as three years in
prison, a $10,000 fine, or both).
12. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). As Justice
Potter Stewart famously remarked, obscenity may be nearly impossible to define, "[b]ut I know it
when I see it." Id
13. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
14. See id; KENT D. STUCKEY ET AL., INTERNET AND ONLINE LAW § 4.02 (2010).
15. STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 14, 4.02. (recognizing that "neither distributors nor
prosecutors" can conclusively declare material obscene because the current legal regime relegates
that decision to the trier of fact); Debra D. Burke, Cybersmut and the First Amendment: A Call

for a New Obscenity Standard,9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 87, 108-10 (1996) (declaring that current
obscenity law "fails to provide meaningful guidance" to either publishers or law enforcement
because juries may reach opposing conclusions both "over time and across jurisdictions"); see W.
Doug Waymire, Alexander v. United States: When a Picture's Worth 1000 Years, 26 U. TOL. L.
REV. 237, 267-68 (1995) (noting that the "'inherent residual vagueness' of any obscenity
definition" may cause publishers to suppress speech voluntarily that approaches "the fringe of
constitutional protection" in order to avoid prosecution (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,

2011]

The Constitutionalityof "Local Community Standards" Online

721

Technological advances and the development of new methods of publication
have exacerbated the dilemma facing putative publishers.1 6 In particular, the
rapid expansion of the Internet, fueled by increasing ease of access' and
popular mobile technology,' 8 has introduced even greater uncertainty into an
already ambiguous area of the law,' 9 accompanied by potentially ominous
results.20
Obscenity status is currently determined by applying the
413 U.S. 49, 84 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting))). Thus, the uncertainty caused by the procedural
aspects of current obscenity law (i.e., allowing the trier of fact to make subjective evaluations),
the lack of a firm substantive definition of obscenity, and the harsh criminal sanctions imposed on
violators may operate as a de facto prior restraint on speech. See id (citing Pittsburgh Press Co.
v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973)).
16. See Burke, supra note 15, at 111 (noting that previously "tolerable" deficiencies in
obscenity law become "intolerable" in the context of online speech).
17.

See AARON SMITH, HOME BROADBAND 2010, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT 6

(Aug. 11, 2010), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/2010/
Home%20broadband%202010.pdf (estimating that sixty-six percent of American adults had a
home broadband connection in May 2010, compared to six percent in April 2001); see also
Obama Announces New

U.S.

Broadband Connection Funding, CNN

(July 2,

2010),

http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/07/01/obama.broadband.connection/index.html (explaining
that $795 million in Recovery and Reinvestment Act funds were devoted to expanding broadband
access to rural communities with "little or no" broadband service). In addition to increased home
access by individuals, many businesses and most academic institutions now offer free Internet
access to consumers. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) ("Most colleges and
universities provide [Internet] access for their students and faculty . . . ."); Claire Cain Miller,
Aiming at Rivals, Starbucks Will Offer Free Wi-Fi, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2010, at BI

(announcing that Starbucks would offer free and unlimited Internet access to customers to
compete with many independent coffee houses and larger chains, such as McDonald's); Jen
Trolio, Top 20 Wired Colleges: #2 MI. T, PCMAG.COM (Dec. 20, 2006), http://www.pcmag.com/
article2/0,2817,2073459,00.asp (touting M.I.T.'s sprawling campus network, which consists of
over "3,000 wireless access points").
18. See Matthew Ingram, Mary Meeker: Mobile Internet Will Soon Overtake FixedInternet,
GIGAOM (Apr. 12, 2010, 2:27 PM PT), http://gigaom.com/2010/04/12/mary-meeker-mobileintemet-will-soon-overtake-fixed-internet/ (reporting that Mary Meeker, respected Internet and
technology analyst, predicted that the number of mobile-Intemet users will surpass the number of
stationary-Intemet users within five years). Meeker also predicted that mobile-Internet traffic
will increase four-thousand percent by 2014. Id
19.

See John Fee, Obscenity and the World Wide Web, 2007 BYU L. REv. 1691, 1691

(2007) (postulating that the "age of mass electronic communication" has generated debate
concerning the proper community to be considered under the "contemporary community
standards" test); Sean J. Petrie, Indecent Proposals: How Each Branch of the Federal
Government Overstepped Its Institutional Authority in the Development of Internet Obscenity

Law, 49 STAN. L. REV. 637, 637-38 (1997) (noting that initial attempts to produce cohesive
federal laws to govern online obscenity resulted in confusion and costly litigation).
20. See Robert F. Goldman, Put Another Log on the Fire, There's a Chill on the Internet:
The Effect ofApplying Current Anti-Obscenity Laws to Online Communications, 29 GA. L. REV.

1075, 1076-78 (1995) (providing a hypothetical example in which online communications
involving nudity, intended for an academic, adult audience, may nonetheless subject the publisher
and the Internet-service provider to criminal sanctions); see also United States v. McCoy, 678 F.
Supp. 2d 1336, 1340 (M.D. Ga. 2009) (discussing the prosecution of a Minnesota resident by
federal authorities in Georgia for publishing fictional works describing sexual and violent
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"contemporary community standards" of a particular local community.21
Material published on the Internet, however, is ubiquitous and is available
notwithstanding geographic boundaries or limitations. 2 2 To avoid fines and
prison sentences in restrictive communities, Internet publishers are forced to
censor the content available to all users-content that would otherwise be
constitutionally protected in more liberal communities.23 Thus, currently
controlling obscenity precedents, when applied to Internet materials, may
result in the suppression of immense amounts of free speech. 24 Given the
Internet's vast capacity both to benefit and harm society by facilitating

encounters with young children). Federal agents, based in Georgia, pursued charges against the
defendant predicated solely on fictional works published online. McCoy, 678 F. Supp. 2d at
1340. A federal magistrate judge in Minnesota denied the government's request for a search
warrant because the published material was not obscene under Miller. Id. at 1340-41. On
appeal, a federal district court judge also refused to issue the requested warrant, agreeing that the
material was not obscene. Id at 1341. The judge also noted that the fictional works were not
publically available to Georgia residents, and that federal agents obtained the materials only after
they emailed the author and requested them. Id. Federal judges in Georgia and Texas, however,
granted the warrants, and, despite the Minnesota court's explicit holding that the fictional works
were not obscene under Minnesota standards, a Georgia grand jury indicted the defendant for
transporting obscenity. Id. at 1340-41. Although the defendant filed numerous motions to
dismiss, a federal judge for the Middle District of Georgia denied them, leaving the defendant
facing the possibility of criminal sanctions due to his writings. See id
21. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973) ("The adversary system, with lay jurors
as the usual ultimate factfinders in criminal prosecutions, has historically permitted triers of fact
to draw on the standards of their community . . . [so t]o require a State to structure obscenity
proceedings around ... a national 'community standard' would be an exercise in futility." (first
emphasis added)); STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 14,

§ 4.02.

22. Reno, 521 U.S. at 853 (acknowledging that the infrastructure of the Internet defies
attempts to restrict access to materials geographically, as there is no "centralized point" from
which either users or Internet publishers can be denied access); Mitchell P. Goldstein, Congress
and the Courts Battle over the First Amendment: Can the Law Really Protect Children from
Pornography on the Internet?, 21 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 141, 203 (2003)

(explaining that a person's geographical location presents no barrier when trying to access
material on the Internet).
23. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 578 (2002) (plurality opinion) (noting that the
broad scope of a prior, unconstitutional statute, in conjunction with the variations in local
community standards, would have forced Internet publishers to restrict speech permissible in
more liberal communities to avoid sanctions in other communities in which the speech would run
"afoul of community standards").
24. See id at 587 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (noting that the inclusion of a local
community standard may render a statute unconstitutional if a party successfully
establishes"substantial overbreadth"); see also Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Adult
Entertainment and the First Amendment: A Dialogue and Analysis with the Industry's Leading

Litigator and Appellate Advocate, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 147, 163-64 (2004) (discussing a
controversial list, promulgated among producers of adult videos, that was designed to minimize
producer liability by suggesting voluntary restrictions on certain potentially permissible content);
Michael J. Gray, Applying Nuisance Law to Internet Obscenity, 6 1/S: J. L. & POL'Y FOR INFO.
Soc'Y 317, 325 (2010) (noting that haphazard enforcement of obscenity laws, coupled with
severe sanctions, can chill online speech).
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25

communication, and the potential that it may emerge as the predominant
medium for publishing and disseminating speech, the chilling of Internet
speech raises critical legal issues. 26
To prevent the suppression of otherwise constitutional speech, some courts,
legislators, and commentators have proposed a national community standard to
evaluate whether online material is obscene. 27 The Supreme Court, however,
in a split 2002 decision, Ashcroft v. ACLU, held that statutory criteria defining
obscenity by referring to local "community standards" were not
unconstitutional.28 Notably, only three Justices were willing to declare
definitively that local community standards are constitutional in the context of
25. See Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec'y of State, Remarks on Internet Freedom at the
Newseum (Jan. 21, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135
519.htm). Specifically, the Secretary of State proclaimed:
Now, in many respects, information has never been so free....
.. . [President Obama has] defended the right of people to freely access information,
and said that the more freely information flows, the stronger societies become. . . .
[A]ccess to information helps citizens hold their own governments accountable,
generates new ideas, encourages creativity and entrepreneurship....
.. . [But t]he same networks that help organize movements for freedom also enable
Al-Qaida to spew hatred and incite violence against the innocent.
Id; see also RICHARD WORTLEY & STEPHEN SMALLBONE,

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PROBLEM-ORIENTED GUIDES FOR POLICE, PROBLEM-SPECIFIC GUIDE SERIES, GUIDE NO. 41:

CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET I (May 2006), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/

files/ric/Publications/e04062000.pdf (expressing the prevalent concern among law
enforcement officials that the rise of the Internet has "dramatically changed the scale and nature
of the child pornography problem").
26.

See John Fine, Net to Newspapers: Drop Dead, BUSINESSWEEK, July 4, 2005, at 24

(discussing the possibility that the Internet may eventually drive traditional publications out of
business); Laurie Petersen, Internet Ad Spending to Overtake All Other Media by 2011: VSS,

MEDIA POST NEWS (Aug. 7, 2007, 6:00 AM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?
fa=-Articles.showArticle&art aid=65282 (stating that a major private-equity firm predicted that
online advertising would generate more revenue than any other form of media, including
broadcast television and traditional periodicals, by 2011).
27. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 587 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) ("[A]doption of a
national standard is necessary in my view for any reasonable regulation of Internet obscenity.");
Id. at 589 (Breyer, J., concurring in part) ("I write separately because I believe that Congress
intended the statutory word 'community' to refer to the Nation's adult community taken as a
whole, not to geographically separate local areas."); United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240,
1254 (9th Cir. 2009) ("[A] national community standard must be applied in regulating obscene
speech on the Internet."); H.R. REP. NO. 105-775, at 28 (1998) ("The Committee recognizes that
the applicability of community standards in the context of the Web is controversial, but
understands it as an 'adult' standard, rather than a 'geographic' standard, and one that is
reasonably constant among adults in America . . . ."); Mark Cenite, Federalizingor Eliminating
Online Obscenity Law as an Alternative to Contemporary Community Standards, 9 CoMM. L. &

POL'Y 25, 25-26 (2004) (noting that the concerns expressed by the concurring Justices in the
Ashcroft opinion may warrant the adoption of a national standard).
28. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 585 (holding that the use of local community standards alone did
not render the statute unconstitutional). The Court expressly refused to comment on potential
overbreadth concerns, vagueness, or the likelihood that the statute could survive strict scrutiny.
Id. at 585-86.
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online obscenity. 29 The other four opinions all questioned the applicability of
local standards,30 and two Justices o enly endorsed the adoption of a national
standard to judge Internet obscenity. Thus, although eight Justices concurred
in the ultimate judgment, the legal analysis behind each decision varied
significantly. 3 2
The highly fractured Ashcroft ruling recently led to a circuit split over
whether a local or national community standard should govern Internet
obscenity. 33 The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Kilbride, interpreted
Ashcroft to require that a jury be instructed to consider national community
standards when deliberating on obscenity charges arising from distribution of
images via email.34 Precedent required the court to interpret the Ashcroft
holding as "that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest ground."3 Five of the Justices who concurred in
the Ashcroft judgment did not disregard the potential overbreadth problems
inherent in the use of a local community standard, as the plurality did, and five
of the Justices "viewed the .

.

. national community standard as not or likely

not posing [serious constitutional] concerns by itself." 36 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit determined that a national community standard was required to
evaluate online obscenity under Ashcroft.

29. See id. at 583 (noting that although Justices John Paul Stevens and Anthony M.
Kennedy concurred in the judgment, they questioned the "applicability of [the] community
standards jurisprudence to the Internet").
30. See id at 587 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) ("[R]espondents' failure to prove
substantial overbreadth on a facial challenge in this case still leaves open the possibility that the
use of local community standards will cause problems for regulation of obscenity on the
Internet . . . in future cases."); id at 589-90 (Breyer, J., concurring in part) (observing that
because the statutory language referred to a national, adult standard rather than local standards,
the Court could avoid examining the statute to determine the existence of a "serious First
Amendment problem"); id. at 593 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he variation in
community standards might well justify enjoining enforcement of the Act."); id at 603 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (decrying the potential use of local community standards as "a sword, rather than a
shield," when applied to online speech).
31. Id at 587 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (stating that a national standard is
imperative for the "reasonable regulation" of online speech); id. at 589-90 (Breyer, J., concurring
in part).
32. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
33. See United States v. Little, 365 F. App'x 159, 164 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (stating
that the Ninth Circuit's justification for applying a national standard to Internet obscenity relied
on Supreme Court dicta instead of the Court's ruling); United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240,
1254 (9th Cir. 2009) (interpreting the Ashcroft opinion as allowing the application of a national
community standard to online-obscenity prosecutions); United States v. Stagliano, 693 F. Supp.
2d 25, 31-32, 31 n.8 (D.D.C. 2010) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Ashcroft).
34. Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1244, 1254.
35. Id. at 1253-54 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)).
36. Id. at 1254.
37.

Id.
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Both the Eleventh Circuit and the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, however, have refuted the Ninth Circuit's interpretation
of Ashcroft to varying degrees.38 In United States v. Little, the defendants
appealed a federal conviction for online distribution of obscene materials and
claimed, in part, that the use of a local community standard to judge Internet
obscenity amounted to a violation of their First Amendment rights. 39 The
Eleventh Circuit refused to follow Kilbride and claimed that the Ninth
Circuit's decision was based solely on dicta; instead, it found that Ashcroft
validated the use of local community standards regardless of the medium of
- - 40
transmission.
Similarly, in United States v. Stagliano, the defendants were prosecuted for
interstate trafficking of obscene materials, and the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia also refused to interpret Ashcroft as requiring
application of national standard.41 The court rejected the defendants' argument
that the federal criminal statutes were overbroad as applied to Internet speech
solely because the statutory criteria defining the obscenity test included local
community standards.42 Thus, both the Eleventh Circuit and the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia have issued opinions that are
diametrically opposed to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Kilbride.43
This Comment traces the development of general obscenity law and the First
Amendment concerns underlying the Kilbride, Little, and Stagliano decisions,
beginning with the assimilation of British common law concepts into
American jurisprudence. Next, it traces the evolution of American obscenity
jurisprudence, including the adoption of the current governing test and the
extension of that test to various mediums of communication. This Comment
then analyzes the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit decisions, as well as the decision
from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in light of
both prior precedent and concerns over whether those precedents are
appropriate to regulate online obscenity. Finally, this Comment discusses the
legal concerns that plague the use of "local community standards" to determine
whether online material is obscene. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that
adopting a bifurcated standard for online obscenity, based on a distinction
between active and passive dissemination, is the most effective method for
minimizing constitutional overbreadth and the suppression of protected speech.

38. See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
39. United States v. Little, 365 F. App'x 159, 161-63 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
Instead, the defendant, relying on the Ashcroft concurrences and dissent, argued that the court
should apply a national community standard. Id. at 163-64.
40. Id. at 164.
41. United States v. Stagliano, 693 F. Supp. 2d 25, 27, 31-32 (D.D.C. 2010).
42. Id. at 33.
43. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
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1. THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN OBSCENITY JURISPRUDENCE
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging

the freedom of speech . . . .
Constitutional 4urisprudence, however,
indicates that the freedom of speech is not absolute.4 The state may regulate
speech given a sufficiently important or compelling interest.46 States have
used this rationale to restrict obscene materials, and laws criminalizing the
publication of such materials date back to the colonial era, appearing as early
as 1712.47 The Supreme Court did not address the extent to which the First
Amendment sheltered obscenity, however, until 1957.48
In Roth v. UnitedStates, the Court considered a First Amendment challenge
to federal obscenity statutes and bluntly pronounced that "obscenity is not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech."4 9 The Court held that the
"lewd and obscene" generally did not promote beneficial social discourse and
thus could be excluded in the interests of "order and morality."so
44. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
45. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) ("[A]
content-based speech restriction . . . can stand only if it satisfies strict scrutiny."); Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997) (holding that content-neutral speech regulations need
only satisfy intermediate scrutiny).
46. See supra note 45. The sufficiency of the state interest varies depending upon whether
the regulation at issue targets the content of speech. Compare Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813
(requiring a compelling interest to regulate speech based on content), with Turner Broad Sys.,
520 U.S. at 189 (allowing content-neutral regulations based upon only "important" state
interests).
47. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-83 (1957) (noting that Massachusetts
specifically banned obscene speech mocking religious ceremonies in 1712 and that by the
beginning of the nineteenth century, every state criminalized either blasphemy or profanity).
48. Id. at 481 ("[Tlhis is the first time the question [of whether obscenity falls within the
protection of the First Amendment] has been squarely presented to this Court, either under the
First Amendment or under the Fourteenth Amendment. . .
49. Id at 485.
50. Id (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1941)). But see
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003) (declaring that private conduct may not be
prohibited on the basis of the majority's view of perceived immorality). Justice Antonin Scalia,
dissenting in Lawrence, argued that by precluding morality as a basis for legislation, the Court's
decision essentially invalidated obscenity laws. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Indeed, in the wake of Lawrence, there have been multiple substantive due process
challenges to the government's ability to regulate obscenity. See, e.g., United States v. Stagliano,
693 F. Supp. 2d 25, 37 (D.D.C. 2010) (addressing the defendants' argument that the obscenity
statutes under which they were charged were unconstitutional because Lawrence restricted the
government from citing morality as a legitimate interest); United States v. Handley, 564 F. Supp.
2d 996, 1008 (S.D. Iowa 2008) (addressing the defendant's argument that Lawrence invalidated
federal obscenity statutes); United States v. Extreme Assocs., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 586
(W.D. Pa. 2005) (discussing the defendant's argument that Lawrence precludes the government
from regulating obscenity solely on moral grounds), rev'd by United States v. Extreme Assocs.,
Inc., 431 F.3d 150, 162 (3d. Cir. 2005).
Courts, however, have generally refused to invalidate obscenity statutes. Some have read
Lawrence as only belonging to a line of substantive due process cases involving fundamental
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Although modem legal theory has eschewed such broad exemptions from
First Amendment protection,5 1 the Court today still recognizes a "limited"
exception for obscenity.52 Thus, governmental authorities may constitutionally
proscribe speech that is deemed obscene, 53 including regulating the electronic
transmission of obscene materials. 54
A. Early Attempts to Define Obscenity Coherentlyand the Rejection of the
British Common Law Test
Traditionally, courts have struggled to delineate obscene speech from
constitutionally protected, albeit offensive and sexually charged, speech.55 In
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, several American courts

liberty interests inherent in marriages and "certain intimate, consensual relationships." See
Stagliano, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 37-38; Handley, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1008 (noting that Lawrence
involved "personal sexual relations in the privacy of an individual's home"). Other courts have
simply held that the Supreme Court has previously rejected the argument that the right to privacy,
implicated in Lawrence, precluded obscenity regulations. See United States v. Coil, 442 F.3d
912, 916 (5th Cir. 2006) (discussing the Supreme Court's continued refusal to interpret the right
to privacy as protecting commercial transactions or distribution of obscene material); Handley,
564 F. Supp. 2d at 1008 (adopting the conclusion of the Third Circuit's opinion in Extreme
Associates Inc.); Extreme Assocs. Inc., 431 F.3d at 159 (declaring that the Supreme Court

previously distinguished the right to privacy and the corollary freedom to possess obscenity in the
home from statutes criminalizing the distribution of obscenity to members of the public)..
Furthermore, Lawrence is explicitly limited to private conduct. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
Thus, Lawrence's holding does not affect obscenity statutes criminalizing the dissemination of
obscene material.
51. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1992) (noting that the Court has
gradually narrowed categorical exceptions to the First Amendment over the past fifty years).
52. Id. at 383.
53. Id. at 383-84. The state, however, may not criminalize mere possession of obscene
materials at home, for doing so violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) ("Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes
regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's own home."). The right
to possess obscene material in private, however, implies no "correlative right" to distribute such
material. United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128 (1973).
The right to private possession also creates no "zone of constitutionally protected privacy [that]
follows such material when it is moved outside the home area." United States v. Orito, 413 U.S.
139, 141-42 (1973). Thus, obscenity statutes criminalizing the sale or dissemination of obscene
materials do not violate First Amendment rights.
54. United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 708-09 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that the federal
statute criminalizing the distribution of obscene materials included electronic transmissions,
based on both the plain language of the statute and congressional intent to design comprehensive
legislation governing the interstate distribution of obscenity); STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 14,
§ 4.02 (stating that obscene electronic materials may be regulated).
55. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704-06, 705 n.l (1968)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring to an "intractable obscenity
problem" and noting that thirteen previous obscenity rulings produced fifty-five separate
opinions).
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adopted an obscenity standard based on British common law. 56 That standard,
culled from Regina v. Hicklin, determined obscenity by evaluating the effect
that the work's isolated, obscene passages had on "particularly susceptible
persons."s? The test, however, eventually fell into disfavor with American
jurists.5 8 As the Roth court noted, "[t]he Hicklin test ... might well encompass
material legitimately treating with sex, and so it must be rejected as
unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and press."59 Thus,
one of the earliest Supreme Court obscenity precedents reflected a desire to
avoid the undue suppression of speech in the quest to prohibit obscenity.60
Moreover, in Roth, the Supreme Court adopted the standard developed by
American courts to replace Hicklin.6 1 The emerging standard evaluated
potentially obscene work by asking "whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to prurient interest."62 According to the Court, "prurient
interest" is different from mere sexual arousal; it denotes "itching, morbid, or
lascivious longings" and "shameful" desire. 63 Thus, the modem test was far
narrower than Hicklin because it allowed potentially obscene passages to be
analyzed in context, judged those passages from the position of an average

56. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488-89, 489 n.25 (1957) (identifying the
British test as the "early leading standard" for defining obscenity).
57. Id at 488-89 (citing Regina v. Hicklin, [1868] 3 Q.B. 360, at 371).
58. See id. at 489 & n.26 (noting that multiple American courts adopted a different standard,
perhaps due to dissatisfaction with the Hicklin test's overly broad reach); United States v.
Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (finding that precedent compelled the court to
apply the Hicklin test despite the unfortunate potential to "reduce [its] treatment of sex to the
standard of a child's library in the supposed interest of a salacious few").
59. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489.
60.

See id.

61. Id. As early as 1907, the New York Court of Appeals tried to moderate the effects of
the overly strict Hicklin standard. See People v. Eastman, 81 N.E. 459, 460 (N.Y. 1907) (per
curiam) (holding that statutory language banning "indecent" material was intended to punish only
obscene material and not intended to "regulate manners"); see also United States v. Dennett, 39
F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1930) (noting that the Eastman court adopted a standard less rigorous than
Hicklin).

Similarly, in 1933, a federal court limited the legal definition of "obscenity" to include only
sexually oriented materials. See United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182,
184 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), af'dsub nom. United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce,
72 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1934). The court further repudiated the Hicklin standard, requiring that
the work be judged by its effect on a person with "average sex instincts." Id. Thus, the Ulysses
decision foreshadowed the eventual "demise" of Hicklin and the ascension of the modem
standard of obscenity. See Robert Trager & Yuri Obata, Obscenity Decisions in the Japaneseand
United States Supreme Courts: Cultural Values in Interpreting Free Speech, 10 U.C. DAVIS J.

INT'L L. & POL'Y 247, 256 (2004).
62. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489.
63.

Id. at 487 n.20, 488 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1996 (2d

ed. 1949).
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community member, and required prurient arousal. 4 The Roth court approved
the narrower test because its safeguards substantially reduced the probability of
inadvertently punishing protected speech.65 By adopting this test, the Court
hoped to reduce the risk that protected speech would be punished in an attempt
to regulate the obscene. 66
B. Adoption of the Current Governing Paradigm:The Miller Test and
Contemporary Community Standards

The Roth standard served as the foundation for the current obscenity test that
was announced in Miller v. California.67 In Miller, the defendant was
convicted for violating California's obscenity law by mailing unrequested,
sexually explicit material.68 The Court held that the state's interest in
regulating obscene material was legitimate "when the mode of dissemination
carries with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling
recipients or of exposure to juveniles," such as sending material through the
mail.69 The Court outlined a three-prong test to guide judges and juries in
assessing obscenity while preventing infringement of a person's First
Amendment rights; the trier of fact should determine
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 70
The first two prongs of the test rely on community standards, despite the
second prong's lack of an explicit reference to such a standard.7'
The Court also addressed the scope of the relevant community to be
considered. 72 The Court rejected the use of a national standard to judge
obscenity7 3 because, historically, courts have allowed "triers of fact to draw on
64. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
65. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489 (noting that the modem test, unlike the Hicklin standard,
possessed safeguards that rendered it constitutional).
66.

See id.

67. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18 n.2, 24 (1973) (adopting the Roth definition of
"obscene materials" and using its language as the basis for the first prong of the Miller test).
68.
69.

Id. at 17-18.
Id at 18-19.

70. Id. at 24 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
71. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500 (1987) (holding that community standards
determine whether a work is patently offensive); STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 14, § 4.02(l)(b)
(citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 30) (noting that local "community standards" were intended to be

applied to the second prong of the Miller test).
72. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30-32.
73. See id. at 32-33 (holding that diverse community standards should not be "strangled by
the absolutism of imposed [national] uniformity").
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the standards of their communit " and "a national 'community standard'
would be an exercise in futility." 4 However, the Court acknowledged that
applying a local standard might chill some speech, especially in cases
involving the risk of criminal prosecution for publishers who misjudge vague
community standards." But, the majority reasoned that an average national
standard would also chill speech because publishers would be unable to
provide sexually oriented materials to communities with more permissive
The Court concluded that although the "fundamental First
standards.
Amendment limitations on the powers of the States do not vary from
community to community,

. .

. this does not mean that there are, or should or

can be, fixed, uniform national standards [to judge obscene material]." 7 Thus,
the Court explicitly favored the use of a local community standard over a
national standard.78
C. Expanding the Influence of Community Standards and the Miller Test

Over the past several decades, the Supreme Court has refined the Miller test
and expanded its influence. 79 Not only has the Court approved the use of the
Miller test to define obscenity at the federal level,so but it has also extended
Miller to encompass various modes of communication.
1. Incorporatingthe Miller Test into FederalStatutes

In Hamling v. United States, the Court approved the inclusion of community
standards in a federal statute.82 The statute at issue in Hamling proscribed the
distribution of obscene materials through the mail. The Court reasoned that
including community-standard provisions in federal statutes, which mirrored
the standards already imposed on publishers by Miller, would have a negligible
74.
75.

Id. at 30 (first emphasis added).
Id. at 33 n.13 (internal citations omitted).

76.

Id

Alhough the Court was emphatic that a national standard was
77. Id at 30.
unconstitutional, the scope of the local community was never clearly defined. See Cenite, supra
note 27, at 35. The Miller Court upheld the use of jury instructions based on California state
standards and referenced the standards of Maine and Mississippi, implying that state boundaries
mark the limit of the local community. Id The Court, however, also referenced the standards of
Las Vegas and New York City, suggesting that a smaller local community also may be
considered. Id
78. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30.
79. See infra Part I.C.1-2.
80. See infra Part I.C. I.
81. See infra Part I.C.2.
82. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105 (1974); see also Nitke v. Ashcroft, 253 F.
Supp. 2d 587, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (per curiam) (citing Hamling, 418 U.S. at 94) (noting that
Hamling was the first case in which the Supreme Court approved the use of local community
standards ina federal statute).
83. See Hamling, 418 U.S. at 91.
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chilling effect on speech. 84 Consequently, the enactment of a federal obscenity
statute did not mandate the creation of a uniform national standard.
By upholding the statute, the Court also implicitly increased liability for any
publisher mailing potentially obscene material. Congress enacted the statute
to permit obscenity prosecutions in districts where the mail was either sent or
received, as well as "any Federal district through which the obscenity passed
while it was on its route through the mails." 87 Thus, because individuals lack
control over mail-delivery routes, Hamling extended Miller's reach to
jurisdictions not deliberately targeted by distributors.
2. The Extension of the Miller Test to Various Methods ofDissemination

The Supreme Court has since extended the Miller test to other mediums of
communication.

In Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, the Court upheld a

federal statute banning obscene "dial-a-porn" phone calls. 90 The petitioners,
purveyors of adult phone conversations, argued that the statute
unconstitutionally created a de facto national standard. 9 1 To avoid prosecution
in less tolerant communities, the petitioners asserted that their content would
have to conform to the most restrictive local standards in the nation.9 Citing
Hamling, the Court rejected the petitioners' facial challenge and reaffirmed the
permissibility of subjecting distributors to varying local standards, even under
federal law. 93 The Court noted that Sable was "free to tailor its messages ...
to the communities it chooses to serve" 94 by using operators or call-screening

84. Id. at 106; see also Nitke, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 603 (citing Hamling, 418 U.S. at 106)
(noting that the inclusion of local community standards in a federal statute would not "materially
alter a pornographer's risk calculus" because the potential for prosecution already existed under
varying state community standards).
85. SeeHamling,418U.S.at 105-06.
86. See Cenite, supra note 27, at 38-39 (citing Hamling, 418 U.S. at 144 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)) (discussing Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.'s critique of Hamling and its impact on
distributors who were unwilling to impose the increased self-censorship required by the Court's
decision).
87. Id. at 38 (quoting Hamling, 418 U.S. at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
88. See Hamling, 418 U.S. at 143-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (declaring that the statute at
issue premised criminal liability on the "chancy course" the mail may take en route to its
destination); Cenite, supra note 27, at 39 (stating that applying Justice Brennan's reasoning to the
Internet could subject Internet publishers to liability in any jurisdiction through which the
electronic information passes).
89. See Cenite, supra note 27, at 38-40 (discussing the extension of Miller to adult
telephone services and Internet bulletin-board services).
90. Sable Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 117-18 (1989).
91. Id at 124.
92. Id ("Sable argues that the legislation ... places message senders in a 'double bind' by
compelling them to tailor all their messages to the least tolerant community.").
93. Id at 125 (citing Hamling, 418 U.S. at 106).
94. Id
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technology. 95 Thus, local community standards are constitutionally applicable
to obscenity transmitted via telephone.96
In United States v. Thomas, the Sixth Circuit "extended the Sable reasoning

to an online bulletin board system."97 The controversy in Thomas arose from
federal convictions for the interstate transportation of obscene materials via the
The defendants appealed, arguing that the application of local
Internet.
community standards chills speech when applied to "computer technology." 99
Specifically, the defendants claimed that publishers providing electronic
content would be forced to tailor the available content to the strictest local
community standards.100 The court, however, noted that the potential for
infringement of First Amendment rights existed only when publishers were
unable to control access to content.1 ' Access to this particular bulletin board
was strictly limited to subscribers, each of whom had completed an application
that included the person's address.102 The court found that, because the
defendants could limit their speech to specific geographical areas based on the
applications, no First Amendment rights were infringed, and the defendants
could be held to varying local community standards.' 0 3
The Thomas decision likely marked Miller's zenith. The sudden and rapid
growth of the Internet reenergized the ebbing constitutional debate concernin
local community standards, as foreshadowed by the issues raised in Thomas.'0
One year after Thomas, the Supreme Court expressed concerns that applying
community standards to Internet content would allow those most likely to be
offended-the most restrictive communities-to judge speech intended for a
national audience in Reno v. ACLU. os The Court noted that individual modes
of dissemination may require varying degrees of scrutiny that would be based,
in part, on the risk of undesired exposure to obscene or indecent material and
95. Id. (suggesting alternative technological means by which companies operating telephone
services could restrict access to particular geographic areas); Cenite, supra note 27, at 39-40.
96. Sable Commc'ns, Inc., 492 U.S. at 125-26 ("There is no constitutional barrier under
Miller to prohibiting communications that are obscene in some communities under local
standards even though they are not obscene in others.").
97. Cenite, supra note 27, at 40; see United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 711-12 (6th Cir.
1996) (noting that the defendants had a screening system in place that allowed them to regulate
membership and access to the obscene materials based on geography, and that Sable explicitly
allowed the courts to require such regulations, regardless of cost to the publisher); STUCKEY ET
AL., supra note 14, § 4.02 (noting that the situation in Thomas differed from previous cases
because the defendants knew and could control who accessed the obscene materials).
98. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 705-06.
99. Id at 711.
100. Id
101. Id.
102. Id.; Cenite, supra note 27, at 40.
103. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 711-12.
104. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
105. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877-78 (1997).
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the invasiveness of the medium of communication.106 However, the Court
found that the Internet, much like adult telephone services, possessed neither of
these qualities because it required users to take "affirmative steps to receive the
communication."' 0 7 Consequently, the Court held that the Internet was not
subject to enhanced scrutiny under the First Amendment,os but it did not
determine whether contemporary community standards alone could render a
statute unconstitutional.1 09
Several years later, in Ashcroft v. ACLU, the Supreme Court addressed the
applicability of local community standards to obscene materials on the
Internet. 1 l0 Ashcroft arose from a challenge to the federal Child Online
Protection Act (COPA). 1 1
In an attempt to avoid the statute being
characterized as unconstitutionally overbroad,112 Congress codified the threeprong Miller test in COPA's definition of "[m]aterial that is harmful to
minors."
Yet, despite the inclusion of the Miller test, the Third Circuit still
106. Id at 868.
107. Id at 868-70.
108. Id. at 870.
109. See id. at 870, 878-79 (noting that the statute at issue was not narrowly tailored to its
underlying goals, as demonstrated by the uncertainty of the statute's scope and the legislature's
failure to consider less restrictive mechanisms to prevent minors from accessing harmful
materials).
110. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 566 (2002) (plurality opinion) ("This case presents
the narrow question whether the Child Online Protection Act's ... use of 'community standards'
to identify 'material that is harmful to minors' violates the First Amendment.").
111. Id. at 566, 571-72. Congress enacted COPA to punish the knowing dissemination of
material that is harmful to minors for commercial purposes via the Internet. See Child Online
Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (2006).
112. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 569-70 (acknowledging that COPA was drafted as a response
to the demise of previous legislation). The Supreme Court was dissatisfied with Congress's first
attempt at regulating online obscenity-the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA)-and
found it to be overbroad and unconstitutional.
See Reno, 521 U.S. at 874; supra text

accompanying notes 104-05. The CDA endeavored to prevent minors from being exposed to
online obscenity, but it suppressed too broad a range of speech that was permissible for adults.
Reno, 521 U.S. at 874. The Court observed that some of the overbreadth concerns stemmed from
the failure to integrate the Miller test fully. Id. at 873-74.
113. See 47 U.S.C. § 231 (e)(6). The statute encompasses
any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or
other matter of any kind that is obscene or that(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find,
taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is
designed to pander to, the prurient interest;
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to
minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated
normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent
female breast; and
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for
minors.
Id

734

Catholic UniversityLaw Review

[Vol. 60:719

found the statute overbroad based on the application of contemporary
community standards to the Internet.l14
The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit in its highly fragmented
Ashcroft decision.s15 The plurality, comprised of three Justices, distanced itself
from the Court's prior statement that "the 'community standards' criterion as
applied to the Internet means that any communication available to a nationwide
audience will be judged by the standards of the community most likely to be
offended by the message." 1 6 Instead, the plurality noted that COPA, unlike
previous acts, codified all three elements of the Miller test, including the
"prurient interest" and "serious value" requirements. 17 The Court reasoned
that the use of local community standards in conjunction with the two limiting
criteria did not infringe on First Amendment rights despite the presence of
varying community standards." 8
Citing Sable, the plurality also noted that the publisher should bear the
burden of complying with various local standards. 19 The Court determined
that publishers who were unable or unwilling to bear the costs of targeting their
material were still free to utilize a different medium to disseminate their
material. 120 Thus, the plurality held that the application of community
standards to Internet publications alone did not render the statute
unconstitutional, regardless of any actual variance in local community
standards. 121
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote separately to address "the
constitutionality and desirability of adopting a national standard for obscenity

114. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 173-74 (3d Cir. 2000), rev'd by Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at
572-73. In making its decision, the Third Circuit relied on the argument that local community
standards, in the context of a national online forum, would allow the most restrictive communities
to dictate the content available nationwide. See id. at 174 (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 877-78).
Interestingly, this particular issue was raised by the court sua sponte during oral argument. Id. at
173-74 (noting that neither the district court, the parties, nor the amicus had emphasized the
constitutional concerns generated by local community standards).
115. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 566, 586, 589, 591, 602.
116. Id. at 577 (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 877-78).
117. Idat578.
118. Id. at 580. The plurality placed particular emphasis on the inclusion of a "serious value"
requirement because it was not intended to be judged by community standards. Id. at 579 ("This
is because 'the value of [a] work [does not] vary from community to community based on the
degree of local acceptance it has won."' (quoting Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500 (1987))).
Instead, the serious value requirement was to be evaluated from the standpoint of a reasonable
person, allowing appellate courts to establish a national minimum for socially redeeming material
as a matter of law. Id. (citing Reno, 521 U.S. at 873).
119. Id at 581 (quoting Sable Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125-26 (1989)).
120. Id at 583 & n.14. But see infra note 185 and accompanying text (arguing that
individuals, small businesses, and public-interest organizations derive particular benefits from the
Internet, not available through traditional publication mediums).
121. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 585.
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for regulation of the Internet."l22 Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment
only because the ACLU had failed to demonstrate any actual, significant
variance in local community standards.123 But Justice O'Connor argued that
reliance on local community standards might place an undue burden on
publishers, given their inability to control geographic access to online
Refuting Miller's assertion that a national standard was
content.124
"unascertainable" due to national diversity, Justice O'Connor noted that the
Court had approved state standards despite the lack of uniform views in any
given state population. 125 Thus, Justice O'Connor concluded that "adoption of
a national standard was] necessary . . . for any reasonable regulation of
Internet obscenity."
Justice Stephen G. Breyer's concurrence was premised on his belief that the
legislative history of COPA indicated that Congress intended for community
standards to be evaluated in the context of "the Nation's adult community
taken as a whole.,,127 Furthermore, Justice Breyer distinguished this case from
Hamling and Sable on the grounds that the characteristics of the Internet
limited a publisher's ability to target particular regions. 128 Thus, Justice
Breyer's opinion also advocated for the eventual adoption of a national
standard to assess online obscenity.
Finally, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Justices David H. Souter
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, also concurred in the judgment.129 Justice Kennedy
echoed Justice Breyer's concern that Hamling and Sable may be inapplicable
to Internet-obscenity cases due to the "distinct attributes" of the Internet and
the technical obstacles in controlling the dissemination of information to
certain areas.130 Justice Kennedy maintained that, in analyzing the reach of the
First Amendment, the Court must assess the unique characteristics of each
medium. 1
Ultimately, Justice Kennedy noted that local standards may
122. Id. at 586 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
123. Id. (agreeing that the respondents had not demonstrated that the statute was overbroad
and therefore unconstitutional).
124. Id. at 587 (expressing concern that such a burden could "potentially suppress an
inordinate amount of expression").
125. Id at 588-89. According to Justice O'Connor, the Internet enhances the plausibility of
a national community standard because it functions to expose even those in isolated communities
to a multiplicity of views and to sustain a national discourse. Id. at 589.
126. Id. at 587, 589 ("[A] national standard is not only constitutionally permissible, but also
reasonable.").
127. Id. at 589-90 (Breyer, J., concurring in part). Justice Breyer stated that interpreting the
statute otherwise "would provide the most puritan of communities with a heckler's Internet veto
affecting the rest of the Nation." Id. at 590.
128. Id. at 590-91.
129. See id at 591 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 594-95.
13 1. Id. ("The economics and the technology of each medium affect both the burden of a
speech restriction and the Government's interest in maintaining it.").
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present specialized First Amendment burdens in the context of the Internet,1 32
but he concluded that the appropriate community standard could not be
determined until the lower court completed a more thorough factual
assessment of the statute and its reach.
Thus, although eight Justices
concurred in the judgment reversing the Third Circuit, they espoused multiple
divergent legal rationales for their decisions.134
D. Post-Ashcroft: The Emergence of a CircuitSplit as to the Constitutionality
ofLocal Community Standards Online
1. The Ninth CircuitInterpretsAshcroft to Require National Community
Standards to Evaluate Online Obscenity
In United States v. Kilbride, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Ashcroft to allow

the use of a national community standard to assess obscenity distributed via
bulk e-mail. 135 The Ninth Circuit invoked Supreme Court precedent to aid in
interpreting the divergent Ashcroft opinions, stating that "[w]hen a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds."l 36 According to the Ninth Circuit, the plurality opinion in Ashcroft
held "that application of either a national community standard or local
community standards to regulate Internet speech would pose no constitutional
concerns by itself."1 37 Accordingly, it determined that the plurality represented
the broadest rationale for reversing the Third Circuit's ruling in Ashcroft. 138
The Ninth Circuit read the concurring opinions, however, as representing
slightly narrower views.1 39 The court found that Justices O'Connor and Breyer
concurred with the plurality's decision that the use of a national standard
would generally not create First Amendment concerns, but dissented from the
plurality's view that a local standard also generated few constitutional
132.

Id at 597.

133. Id at 601-02 (stating that a finding of overbreadth would necessarily depend on a
variety of factors not adequately addressed by the lower courts, including a determination of what
material is "to be taken as a whole" and of how community standards vary across jurisdictions
with respect to that specific material).
134. See supra notes 122-33 and accompanying text.
135. United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1244, 1254 (9th Cir. 2009).
136. Id, at 1253-54 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Kilbride court also noted that the Ninth Circuit previously
invoked the Marks doctrine to support its finding that the concurring opinion of a lone Justice
represented the narrowest position of the Court. Id at 1254 (quoting United States v. Williams,
435 F.3d 1148, 1157 n.9 (9th Cir. 2006)).
137. Id at 1254.
138. See id
139. Id at 1252-53 ("Justice Thomas's blanket dismissal of the overbreadth problem ... was
not joined by a majority of the Court.").
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concerns.140 Thus, according to the Ninth Circuit, five Justices held the narrow
view that use of a national standard created few constitutional implications.14 1
Furthermore, the court stated that Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg
agreed with Justices O'Connor and Breyer that using the local community
standard presented grave First Amendment concerns. 42 The Ninth Circuit
found that Justices O'Connor and Breyer's concurrences controlled because
those opinions embodied the narrow holdings extrapolated from Ashcroft.143
Thus, the Ninth Circuit was persuaded "that a national community standard
must be applied in regulating obscene speech on the Internet, including
obscenity disseminated via email." 1"
2. CircuitsRetainingLocal Community Standards Under Ashcroft

Conversely, the Eleventh Circuit has refused to adopt a national standard in
the aftermath of Ashcroft.145 In United States v. Little, which arose from
alleged offenses under federal obscenity statutes for marketing obscene videos
online, the defendants appealed their convictions and claimed that the use of
local community standards under Miller violated their First Amendment
rights.146 The appeal specifically referred to the Ashcroft concurrences and
dissent, and the court noted the Ninth Circuit's holding in Kilbride.4 7 The
Eleventh Circuit, however, viewed the language relied upon in Kilbride as
dicta. 148 In particular, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the language in Justice
O'Connor's opinion reflected her personal opinion, not necessarily her legal
conclusions.14 Moreover, the court viewed Justice Kennedy's concurring
decision to remand as requiring no decision as to whether the statute embodied
a local or national standard, implying that further commentary on the benefits
and dangers of those standards were dicta.150 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit found
that Miller's local-community-standards test still prevailed.' 1

140. Id at 1254.

141.

Id

142.

Id

143. Id ("[W]e must view the distinction Justices O'Connor and Breyer made between the
constitutional concerns generated by application of a national and local community standards as
controlling.").
144. Id
145. See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
146. United States v. Little, 365 F. App'x 159, 160-62 (1 Ith Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
147. Id at 163-64 (noting that appellants argued for the application of a national community
standard based on the Ashcroft concurrences and dissent, an argument supported by the Ninth
Circuit in Kilbride).

148.
149.
150.
151.

Id at 164.
Id at 164 & n.10.
Id.
Id at 164.
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Similarly, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held
that Ashcroft left Miller and the local-standards test intact.152 The defendant in
United States v. Stagliano claimed that the federal obscenity statutes under
which he was charged were unconstitutionally overbroad as applied to Internet
publishers because they incorporated Miller's local-community-standard test to
judge obscenity.153 The district court, interpreting Ashcroft, noted that five
Justices had indeed held that applying local community standards to an online
setting under COPA risked creating potential overbreadth issues.1 54 But, the
court also stated that the majority of the Justices concurring in the Ashcroft
judgment also held that the use of local community standards alone did not
render the statute overly broad absent a substantially stronger showing of
actual variation in community standards.iss Furthermore, the district court
observed that the challenged federal criminal statutes regulated far less
material than COPA.1 56 Thus, if inclusion of local community standards in
COPA did not create substantial suppression of protected speech, application
of those same local standards to a less inclusive criminal statute could not
logically violate the First Amendment. 1 Therefore, the court rejected any
interpretation of Ashcroft that required application of a national community
standard. 1
II. AN ACCURATE READING OF ASHCROFT REJECTS THE OPPOSING POSITIONS
OF THE NINTH AND ELEVENTH CIRCUITS

Based on prior law and contemporaneous commentary, the Ninth Circuit's
analysis of Ashcroft in Kilbride is only partially correct. Invoking the Marks
doctrine, which defines the holding of a fragmented decision as the "narrowest

152.

United States v. Stagliano, 693 F. Supp. 2d 25, 31 & n.8 (D.D.C. 2010).

153.

Id. at 29.

154. Id. at 31 & n.7. Only Justice Breyer, however, found a national standard to be
appropriate despite the lack of evidence on whether highly variable local community standards
actually existed. See id. at 31 n.8. The district court concluded that Justice Breyer's concurrence
was not the narrowest holding and was therefore not controlling. Id.
155. Id at 31 & n.8.
156. Id. at 32-33. The statutes at issue included 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462, 1465, and 1466 and 47
U.S.C. § 223(d), all of which prohibit the interstate transport or distribution of obscene materials.
Id. at 28. The defendants challenged § 1465 and § 223(d) specifically because each statute
criminalized the "use of an interactive computer service" to traffic obscenity. Id. at 29; see also
18 U.S.C. § 1465 (2006 & Supp. III 2009); 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (2006 & Supp. III 2009). The
court distinguished the challenged statutes from COPA, observing that COPA generated powerful
constitutional concerns due to the broad range of materials it regulated. Stagliano, 693 F. Supp.
2d at 32. COPA purported to cover all material harmful to minors, but the federal obscenity
statutes at issue merely regulated obscenity, which is a far narrower class of speech. Id. at 32-33.
157. Stagliano, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 31-33.
158. Id. at 31 n.8 (disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit's holding that Ashcroft required a
national community standard to evaluate online obscenity).
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grounds" on which five Justices agree,159 the Ninth Circuit constructed two
separate, narrow holdings: that application of local community standards may
generate First Amendment concerns, and that a national standard would likely
not. 160
A. ProperlyInterpreted,Ashcroft Providesfor Continued Challenges to the
Use ofa Local Standardin the Online Context

The first holding extrapolated in Kilbride, that a local standard may be
constitutionally questionable, is a valid reading of the various Ashcroft
opinions.1 Rather than viewing this discussion as dicta, as suggested by the
Eleventh Circuit,162 the concerns expressed by the concurring Justices in
Ashcroft reveal the varying legal rationales underlying the ultimate decision to
vacate the lower court's holding declaring local community standards
unconstitutional. 163 Although eight Justices concurred in the judgment, only
the plurality was willin to definitively declare local community standards
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer on the
constitutionally sound.'
other hand, questioned the constitutionality of local standards as applied to the
Internet, based on serious concerns that the use of local community standards
would suppress vast swaths of protected speech.165 Due to these concerns, the
159. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
160. United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1254 (9th Cir. 2009).
161. See Stagliano, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 31 nn.7-8 (noting that five Justices expressed
concerns that local standards, applied in the context of the Internet, may serve to stifle otherwise
protected speech). But see United States v. Little, 365 F. App'x 159, 163-64 (11th Cir. 2010)
(per curiam) (referring to remarks in Ashcroft that advocated for a national standard as mere
dicta).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 148-49.
163. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 586-87 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part)
(joining with the plurality not because the use of local community standards was constitutional
per se, but because the litigant had failed to prove significant, actual variation in community
standards); id. at 590 (Breyer, J., concurring in part) (concurring in the judgment not because
local standards were constitutionally valid, but because the legislative history of COPA indicated
that Congress intended community standards to be national, which would present no
constitutional concerns); id. at 593 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (finding that "community
standards" may still present constitutional concerns despite the plurality's view to the contrary).
Thus, the remarks of the concurring Justices are far from dicta, particularly because of the ability
of future litigants to challenge the application of local community standards to online content.
164. See id. at 583 (plurality opinion) (acknowledging that although Justices Stevens and
Kennedy expressed reservations concerning the applicability of local community standards to
Internet speech, the plurality concluded that no medium-specific standard was warranted);
Stagliano, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 31 n.8 (stating that although the plurality in Ashcroft upheld COPA
despite any actual variation in community standards, the five concurring Justices acknowledged
the potential constitutional ramifications that could result given sufficient actual variation in
community standards).
165. See Stagliano, 693 F. Supp. at 31 & n.7. Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment
solely because the ACLU had failed to prove that significant variations in local community
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five concurring Justices welcomed future constitutional challenges to the use
of local standards to judge online obscenity, given sufficient and substantial
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
evidence of varying community standards.
properly held that one may still challenge local community standards under the
First Amendment.
B. Despite ConstitutionalConcerns Plaguingthe Local Standard,Ashcroft
Does Not Mandate the Use ofa National Standard

However, the second holding in Kilbride-thata national standard presents
few constitutional concerns-is premised on a false assertion. Having
established that local standards could raise serious First Amendment issues, the
Ninth Circuit then found that a majority of the Ashcroft Justices viewed a
national standard as less likely to generate similar concerns.167 This finding
was based upon the court's belief that the Ashcroft plurality could be broadly
construed as holding that a national standard would "pose no constitutional
concerns by itself."16 8 Reading the plurality in conjunction with the
concurrences by Justices O'Connor and Breyer, the Ninth Circuit identified
five Justices who supported the constitutionality of a national standard.169
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit provided no support for the notion that the
plurality had affirmed the constitutionality of a national standard. 170 In fact, at
no point did the plurality opinion openly address the viability of a national
To the contrary, Justice Clarence Thomas attempted to distance
standard.
the Court from recent statements that might potentially support adopting a
national standard.172 The Ninth Circuit itself stated in Kilbride that "Justice
standards existed that would have resulted in the suppression of a substantial amount of otherwise
protected speech. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 586-87 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part). Justice
Breyer construed the statutory standard as a national adult standard in part because doing so
circumvented "the need to examine the serious First Amendment problem that would otherwise
exist." Id. at 590 (Breyer, J., concurring in part). Finally, although he stopped short of finding
the Act unconstitutional, Justice Kennedy stated that "[t]he national variation in community
standards constitute[d] a particular burden on Internet speech." Id. at 597 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
166. See supra notes 122-33 and accompanying text.
167. United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1254 (9th Cir. 2009).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See id. (asserting, without explanation or citation to the text of the opinion, that the
plurality in Ashcroft broadly affirmed the constitutionality of both the national and local
community standards).
171. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 564-86 (2002).
172. Id at 577-78. In a previous ruling involving COPA's predecessor, the Court "noted that
'the "community standards" criterion as applied to the Internet means that any communication
available to a nationwide audience will be judged by the standards of the community most likely
to be offended by the message."' Id. at 577 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877-78
(1997)). This statement may be construed as acknowledging one of the principle rationales for
adopting a national standard, if not as tacit support for it. Justice Thomas, however, took great
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Thomas's opinion both denies the utility of and need for applying a national
community standard." 73 Moreover, Justice O'Connor's remarks supporting a
national standard have been widely considered dicta.174 Thus, contrary to the
Ninth Circuit's holding, a majority of the Ashcroft Justices did not adopt the
notion that a national standard presented few constitutional issues.' 75 One of
the two holdings constructed by the Ninth Circuit is therefore flawed,
invalidating its conclusion that "a national community standard must be
applied in regulating obscene speech on the Internet."l 76
Equally invalid, however, is the Eleventh Circuit's dismissal of the Ashcroft
concurring opinions as undeserving of any weight.177 As the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia noted in Stagliano, the concerns of
the concurring Justices relating to the potential constitutional infirmities of a
local standard are clearly relevant because they indicate that future facial and
as-applied challenges to the use of local standards may be successful if
sufficient proof of divergent local community standards exists.
Thus,
although courts may be free to find local standards inapplicable to online
obscenity, the ability of the courts to adopt broad national standards remains
questionable in light of Ashcroft and the Ninth Circuit's flawed reasoning in
Kilbride.179
pains to explain that this particular sentiment was inapplicable to the current case because
Congress had adopted the remaining portions of the Miller test in COPA, whereas the earlier
statute had only adopted the first prong. Id. at 577-78. The effort put into explaining away this
statement surely contradicts the notion that the plurality supported a national standard.
173. Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1252.
174. See United States v. Little, 365 F. App'x 159, 164 & n.10 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
Justice O'Connor's earlier remarks concerning the local standard were not dicta because they
were necessary to understand the legal reasoning behind her ruling to vacate and remand the
Third Circuit's decision. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 586-87 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
Her remarks about the national standard, however, were gratuitous and therefore may be
considered dicta. See id. ("I write separately to express my views on the constitutionality and
desirability of adopting a national standard . . . .").
175. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 596
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that even if a national standard were adopted, "the actual
standard applied is bound to vary by community nevertheless"). Thus, at least six Justices failed
to endorse the application of a national community standard.
176. Kilbride,584 F.3d at 1254 (emphasis added).
177. Little, 365 F. App'x at 164.
178. See United States v. Stagliano, 693 F. Supp. 2d 25, 31 & nn.7-8 (D.D.C. 2010). The
district court appeared to concur with the Ninth Circuit's opinion that local standards are not per
se constitutional, despite finding that the challenged federal criminal statutes were too narrow to
generate substantial overbreadth concerns even if a local community standard was read into them.
Id.

179. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973) ("Under a National Constitution,
fundamental First Amendment limitations on the powers of the States do not vary from
community to community, but this does not mean that there are, or should or can be, fixed,
uniform national standards . . . .") (emphasis added). But see Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 587
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (denying that Supreme Court precedent forbade the adoption of
a national standard).

742

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 60:719

C. Policy Favors Adoption ofa National Standard

Although the legal justification for adopting a national standard remains
tenuous, a clear policy preference exists in favor of adopting a national
standard.180 Assessing obscenity based on local standards presents legitimate
First Amendment concerns.' 81 Despite obscenity being viewed as outside the
purview of First Amendment protection,182 the state may not suppress
substantial quantities of otherwise-protected speech while attempting to
regulate obscenity.' 8 3 In an online context, however, using various local
standards to judge obscenity requires Internet publishers to abide by the
restrictions of the least tolerant community to minimize the risk of criminal
prosecution, thereby creating First Amendment issues.' 84
Internet speech is particularly susceptible to the vagaries of local standards
and threats of criminal penalties because a substantial number of Internet
publishers are actually unsophisticated individuals or small organizations,
potentially foreclosed from publishing freely through more traditional
mediums.185 Additionally, these individual users or small organizations may
be particularly susceptible to the suppressive effects of local standards because
180. See infra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
181. See supra Part II.A (arguing that Ashcroft may be read as allowing future challenges to
the use of local community standards if significant quantities of constitutional speech are
suppressed and an undue burden is placed on Internet publishers).
182.

See Miller, 413 U.S. at 23.

183. See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118 (2003); Stagliano, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 29;
Cenite, supra note 27, at 56 (noting that regulatory schemes should be assessed based on the
volume of protected speech suppressed, even when the "goal is regulating unprotected
expression").
184. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 590 (Breyer, J., concurring in part) ("To read the statute as
adopting the community standards of every locality in the United States would provide the most
puritan of communities with a heckler's Internet veto affecting the rest of the Nation."); Cenite,
supra note 27, at 56-57 (detailing the concerns associated with the "least tolerant community"
conundrum).
185. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 & n.9 (1997) (noting that the Internet makes
publication much easier and allows individuals and community organizations, in addition to
commercial entities and government organizations, to disseminate information); Martin H. Redish
& Kirk J. Kaludis, The Right of Expressive Access in First Amendment Theory: Redistributive
Values and the Democratic Dilemma, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1083, 1131 (1999) (designating the

Internet as the "new marketplace of expression" because it allows individuals to disseminate
information publicaly, bypassing traditional intermediaries such as the "institutional media");
Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an UnintermediatedExperience,

78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 697, 697 (2010) (noting that the Internet may allow individuals to
communicate with a wide-ranging audience and thereby avoid traditional media "gatekeepers"
from influencing or restricting content); see also Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will
Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1821 (1995) (theorizing that the decreased costs of transmitting
information electronically could allow public-interest organizations, such as the ACLU, to
communicate with their members more frequently, and could also allow them to generate
additional support for initiatives by reaching nonmembers more easily); supra note 17 and
accompanying text (noting that a majority of adult Americans now have personal
broadband-Internet access).
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they may lack the financial and legal resources necessary to protect themselves
against liability or to fight criminal prosecution. '
Thus, using local
community standards presents an even greater threat to speech disseminated by
individuals or small businesses.' 87
Using a national standard to evaluate Internet obscenity would suppress far
less speech.' 88 A "minimal" national standard, as proposed by some
commentators, would entirely eliminate overbreadth concerns because only
material judged obscene by the most permissive communities would result in
criminal charges.189 A minimal national standard, however, would likely
violate the rationale underlying Miller.190 Thus, an "average" national
standard, based on neither the most restrictive nor permissive community
standards, may be more appropriate because it would likely comply with
Miller's philosophical underpinnings and would suppress only the most
egregious forms of obscenity. 9 An average national standard may result in
186. See Karen M. Markin, It's Not the Thought that Counts: A Political Economy of
Obscenity, 58 S.C. L. REv. 883, 893 (2007) (stating that in the "vast majority" of the reviewed
obscenity cases, the government pursued actions against small businesses, which lacked the funds
needed to fight the prosecution, rather than against larger publishers or corporations). Moreover,
the Supreme Court was "aware that police action against small businesses could be quite effective
in silencing obscene discourse." Id The government also tried to suppress speech by creating
adverse economic conditions for publishers of potentially obscene material. See Ross A. Keene,
The Threat of Multiple Prosecutions as PriorRestraint, 40 FED. B. NEWS & J. 383, 384 (1993)

(describing a Justice Department strategy of repeatedly charging multiple individuals and
corporations in various jurisdictions because eventually, the cost of defending against the criminal
charges would become prohibitive).
187. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
188. See Cenite, supra note 27, at 57 (stating that a national standard would restrict the
"influence of the least tolerant community" in the context of online obscenity).
189. Id. at 59.
190. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973) (noting that the Court intended the
community-standards test to reflect the views of the average citizen rather than the views of a
particularly sensitive individual). Thus, under Miller, a legal regime that allows the most
permissive communities to define the national standard for obscenity would be as intolerable as
allowing the most restrictive to dictate the boundaries of permissible content. See id
191. See Cenite, supra note 27, at 58-59. Cenite provides an excellent hypothetical to
illustrate the quantity of speech potentially suppressed under local, minimal national, and average
national standards. Id. at 59-61. In the hypothetical, a nation is comprised of three equivalent
communities, and each community rates obscene material on a scale ranging from one (least
obscene) to ten (most obscene). Id. at 59. Two of the communities allow obscene materials rated
as high as eight, but the third allows only material rated at two or below. Id at 59-60. For online
obscenity, a local standard would allow the third community to dictate the standard for the other
two communities, essentially suppressing all material rated three or higher in every community.
Id. at 60. Thus, materials rated three through eight would be suppressed in two-thirds of the
nation even though those portions of the nation would allow the materials, resulting in twelve
"units" of suppressed speech. Id. A minimal national standard, on the other hand, would punish
distributors who disseminated materials rated nine or ten, which would result in no suppression of
speech or overbreadth. Id. at 61. Finally, an average national standard would suppress material
rated higher than six (the average maximum permissible rating) in all three communities, which
would result in the suppression of some speech in the more permissive communities. Id 60-61.
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some overbreadth, but far less than the current application of local community
standards.19 2 Furthermore, publishers could easily discern and understand a
national standard, reducing the cost and need to research and comply with
myriad local restrictions. 19 As a matter of policy, a national standard is far
superior to a local standard because it suppresses less speech. 194
Critics of the national standard raise several objections to this approach.1 95
First, a national standard would continue to suppress otherwise-protected
speech.196 However, although a national standard may suppress some speech,
it would suppress less speech than local standards.1 9 7 Second, critics claim that
a national standard is a practical impossibility.198 Such criticism, however,
ignores the fact that local community standards may also encompass large
areas marked by a diversity of opinions.1 99
Third, critics claim that using a national standard may create legal
complications. 200 Previous obscenity precedents have held, for example, that

The total amount of speech suppressed under the average national standard would, however, only
be four units. See id. Thus, an average national standard has the potential to eliminate some of
the more severe overbreadth concerns that plague the local standards in an online context. See id
at 59-60.
192. See supra notes 188, 191.
193. See Cenite, supra note 27, at 57.
194. See supra notes 188-93 and accompanying text; see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,
874-75 (1997) (noting that no government interest can justify the "unnecessarily broad
suppression of speech addressed to adults," particularly when less restrictive means of promoting
that government interest exist); Sable Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 130-31 (1989)
(invalidating a statute that was not narrowly tailored to the "compelling interest of preventing
minors from being exposed" to harmful material because the statute suppressed material that
adults were otherwise permitted to access); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)
(discarding the Hicklin test in favor of a less restrictive standard to avoid undue unconstitutional
restriction "of the freedoms of speech and press").
195. See, e.g., Shannon Creasy, Defending Against a Charge of Obscenity in the Internet
Age: How Google Searches Can Illuminate Miller's "Contemporary Community Standards," 26

GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1029, 1041 (2010) (noting that opponents believe that "a national standard
would be unascertainable" and that a majority of the Court has never endorsed a national
standard).
196. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 n.13 (1972) (noting that even if a national
standard was implemented, speech would still be restricted in the most permissive communities).
197. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
198. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 30 (opining that the nation is too diverse to encapsulate the
views of all fifty states into a single standard).
199. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 588-89 (1973) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part)
(noting that diverse opinions exist in local communities such as California, which has a
population of33 million people and "includes both Berkeley and Bakersfield").
200. Meredith Leigh Friedman, Keeping Sex Safe on the Information Superhighway:
Computer Pornographyand the FirstAmendment, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1025, 1046-47 (1996)

(noting that obscenity cases are factually rich and need careful "case-by-case" consideration);
Jason Kipeness, Revisiting Miller After the Striking of the Communications Decency Act: A
ProposedSet of Internet Specific Regulationsfor Pornographyon the Information Superhighway,
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burdening publishers with the tasks of ascertaining the individual standards of
each locality and restricting the dissemination of their materials to specific
geographical areas may be significant but is not unconstitutional.20 1 Yet, these
obscenity precedents may be inapplicable in an online setting due to the
technological limitations that prevent Internet publishers from targeting
specific geographic areas. 2 02
Some of these obscenity precedents might still apply in certain settings. The
holding in Hamling, however, is not as easily dismissed by those seeking to
eliminate local standards online because Hamling did not rely on the ability of
a particular speaker to target a geographical area. 203 In fact, Hamling affirmed
a statute expressly enacted to allow criminal prosecution of publishers
disseminating obscenity through the mail in any district through which the

mail passed. Because publishers cannot control the course the mail takes,
Hamling permitted the prosecution of publishers in areas that they had not
targeted and in districts in which they had not intentionally offered their
material. 205 Thus, Hamling may not be dismissed cavalierly based on the
inability of Internet publishers to target certain communities. As a result, any
proposed national standard must distinguish the Internet from other forms of
communication, without relying solely on technological limitations and
geographical audiences.

14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 391, 425 (1998) (noting that the Internet could
pose a challenge to continuing the Miller doctrine).
201. See, e.g., Sable Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125-26 (1989).
202. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 587 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (reasoning that cases

involving online obscenity are distinguishable from prior decisions, such as Hamling and Sable,
"given Internet speakers' inability to control the geographic location of their audience"); id. at
590 (Breyer, J., concurring in part) ("The technical difficulties associated with efforts to confine
Internet material to particular geographic areas . . . potentially weaken the authority of prior cases
in which they were not present."); id. at 595-96 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (cautioning that

different methods of communication must be analyzed individually to account for economic
factors and technological concerns). But see id. at 580-82 (plurality opinion) (explaining that

Hamling was not predicated upon the ability to limit distribution geographically, and that Sable
mentioned such an ability "only as a supplemental point").
203. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 144 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the majority utilized community standards due to the uncertain path that materials
may travel through the mail); Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 582 (acknowledging that the Hamling
decision neither relied on nor even mentioned a publisher's ability to target specific
communities).
204. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
205.

See Cenite, supra note 27, at 38.
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III. ADOPTING A BIFURCATED STANDARD FOR EVALUATING ONLINE
OBSCENITY BEST REDUCES OVERBREADTH AND ACCOUNTS FOR PRIOR
PRECEDENT

Adopting a bifurcated standard that distinguishes between active and passive
modes of dissemination is within the boundaries set by prior precedent. o0 As
the Court explained in Miller, the state has a "legitimate interest in prohibiting
dissemination . . . of obscene material when the mode of dissemination carries

with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients
or of exposure to juveniles."207 Furthermore, the Court recently noted that
different methods of communication require varying levels of regulation based
on the invasive nature of the medium, the risk of exposure to juveniles, and
actions required to access the material.208
When a publisher utilizes an active mode of dissemination-requiring few,
if any, affirmative steps to access the material-greater regulation may be
required.209 Conversely, less stringent regulation may be appropriate for
passive dissemination, which requires a concerted effort to view questionable
content.210 Thus, active modes of dissemination should be judged using the
more-restrictive local community standards, and passive modes should be
judged using the less restrictive national standard when technological
limitations prevent publishers from restricting access to their materials in
certain communities.
Hamling and Miller seemingly upheld the use of local, restrictive standards
for active dissemination because both involved materials shipped through the
mail.212 Materials distributed through the mail, and even e-mail that circulates
obscene material, exemplify active dissemination because they require no

206. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 594-95 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that "each mode of
expression" must be analyzed individually); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868-70
(1997) (noting that various mediums of communication merit varying levels of regulation, based
on invasiveness, risk of unwanted exposure to obscene or indecent material, and whether
"affirmative steps" are needed to access the material (quoting Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28)).
207. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973) (emphasis added).
208.

See supra note 206.

209. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 868-69 (noting that broadcast media, such as radio and television,
is more "invasive" than other forms of communication because audiences may be accidentally
exposed to potentially obscene material; therefore, heightened regulation and scrutiny is
appropriate).
210. See id. at 869-70 (refusing to apply any increased "First Amendment scrutiny" to the
Internet).
211. See infra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
212. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 91 (1974); Miller, 413 U.S. at 18-19
(declaring that materials distributed through the mail carry a "significant danger of offending the
sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles," thus providing the state with a
legitimate interest in regulating that particular mode of dissemination).
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213

affirmative effort to be viewed, thereby increasing the risk of exposure to
juveniles and unwilling recipients.
Prior precedent also supports using a national standard for passive modes of
dissemination, but only when technology impedes the publisher's ability to
214
Sable, for
limit distribution of materials to specific geographic areas.
example, involved a telephone business that provided access to obscene
materials only after the customer dialed a specific telephone number and
agreed to pay a fee. 215 The mode of dissemination in Sable was passive rather
than active. Moreover, the Sable Court explicitly noted that technology
allowed the distributing business to limit access to certain geographical
areas.216 Similarly, in Thomas, the Sixth Circuit applied a local standard
because the Internet publisher distributed materials through the mail and
utilized an application process that revealed the geographic location of users.217
Thus, in cases involving passive dissemination, the ability to target geographic
audiences is dispositive.
Distinguishing prior case law based on active and passive modes of
dissemination removes the legal barriers preventing courts from applying
national standards to Internet-obscenity cases. The majority of Internet
publishers merely display material on websites that require users to actively
seek the material, and thereby engage in passive dissemination.218 Because
those Internet publishers have little control over accessibility due to
technological limitations, prior precedent is inapplicable and a national
standard should be applied.

213. See supra notes 206, 212.
214. See infra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
215. Sable Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 117-118 (1989) (describing the
"dial-a-porn" business model); see also Reno, 521 U.S. at 869-70 (distinguishing the telephone
service in Sable from more invasive modes of dissemination because gaining access to the adult
telephone messages required users to exert effort).
216. Sable Commc'ns Inc., 492 U.S. at 125 (noting that the company could "hire operators to
determine the source of the calls" or develop a more sophisticated screening system to block
certain calls); see also Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 587 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part) ("[G]iven Internet speakers' inability to control the geographic location of their audience,
expecting them to bear the burden of controlling the recipients of their speech . . . may be entirely
too much to ask . . . ."). But see id. at 582-83 (plurality opinion) (stating that the ability of a
publisher to control distribution of potentially obscene materials is irrelevant because publishers
unwilling to subject themselves to varying community standards may simply avoid using the
Internet as a mode of dissemination).
217. United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 711-12 (6th Cir. 1996).
218. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 852 (finding that the majority of Internet information is accessed
though webpages, each with a singular address, comparable to a telephone number). Users may
access the information by entering the web address or by clicking on a link. Id. Thus, "users
seldom encounter such [sexually explicit] content accidentally" because many webpages require
users to bypass a warning. Id at 854. The majority of Internet publishers engage in passive
dissemination. See supra notes 207, 210 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the Ninth Circuit's erroneous holding that Ashcroft requires the
application of a national standard to online obscenity cases,219 a national
standard may still be applicable in certain circumstances. 2 20 As a matter of
general policy, national standards in the online context are far superior to local
standards. 221 Under Hamling and Miller, however, local standards remain
constitutional for Internet publishers engaged in active dissemination-such as
sending bulk e-mail-despite the possibility of chilling speech. 222
Publishers engaged in passive dissemination may be held to local standards
only if technology permits the publisher to target certain communities or to
restrict the availability of its material to specific geographic areas. 223 Because
technology currently prohibits Internet publishers from enacting such
224
restrictions,
the application of local standards may present constitutional
overbreadth concerns.225 Adopting an average national standard for such
publishers would clearly suppress less speech than applying a local standard
while adhering to the principles in Miller.226 Because the Internet provides
unparalleled opportunities for individuals and public organizations to be heard
in the "marketplace of expression,"227 a national standard for assessing online
obscenity is imperative to avoid suppressing otherwise-protected speech.

219. See supra Part II.B.
220. See supra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
221. See supra Part II.C (noting that the threat of suppressing free expression diminishes with
a national as opposed to a local standard for judging obscenity).
222. See supra notes 206, 212 and accompanying text.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 214-17.
224. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
226. See supra Part II.C.
227. See Redish, supra note 185, at 1131.

